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Environmental Law and the Supreme Court:
Three Years Later
RiCHARD J. LAzARus*
Since my Garrison lecture three years ago, the Court has re-
mained remarkably constant in at least one significant respect: Its
membership. Justice Breyer remains today, as he was three years
ago, the most junior Justice. Political scientists dub a court made
up of the same judges over time as a "natural court." Because Jus-
tice Breyer joined the Court in 1994, that means the Supreme
Court has been a "natural court" for eight years and counting.
While that might not seem like along time to some, for the Su-
preme Court that is a very long time. Indeed, it is the second long-
est time in the Court's history. Between 1811 and 1823, when
there were only seven Justices on the Court, there were no
changes in membership. Only on two other occasions has the
Court gone for as long as six years.'
The significance for environmental law is considerable. This
is a Court with an affirmative agenda. It is not a passive Court.
The Justices have discrete areas of law that they are interested in
shaping and, because the Justices know each other so well, they
are better able to maintain the stable majority necessary for such
a shaping to be accomplished. They, accordingly, systematically
grant review and decide cases that present the relevant legal is-
sues in settings favorable to the outcome that the majority seeks
to promote. When, moreover, the Court is so capable of sending
out such clear signals, it is far more likely that sympathetic insti-
tutional litigants and lower court judges can effectively serve up
to the Court cases that are attractive vehicles for lawmaking.
The upshot has been a Court able to issue a series of major
related rulings in relatively short order. The gradual incre-
mentalism that is supposedly structurally built into judicial deci-
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks are owed to
Carrie Jenks, Georgetown University Law Center 2003, who provided outstanding
research assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. See Supreme Court Historical Society, Presidential nominees, available at
http://www.supremecourthistory.org/fp/courtlist.htm; see also THE OXFORD COMPAN-
ION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (Kermit Hall, ed. 1992).
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sion-making is in short supply these days. The opportunity for
conflict with the other branches of government is correspondingly
increased. Deprived of a meaningful opportunity to reshape their
own lawmaking efforts in response to the Court's rapidly evolving
jurisprudence, the legislative and executive branches more fre-
quently find themselves out of step with the Court. Once out of
step, the lawmaking efforts of the other branches are more suscep-
tible to legal challenge. That is also why the current Court, not-
withstanding its "conservative" views, seems especially ready to
overturn the decisions of other branches within the federal system
and of state sovereigns. 2 In short, the stability within the Court is
the source of some instability in its dealings with other parts of
the government.
The Court's resurgent activism has been and portends to con-
tinue to be highly relevant to environmental law because of the
way that environmental law interacts with those areas of law on
the Court's front burner. Environmental law, largely because of
the nature of the ecological problem that it seeks to address, de-
pends upon certain institutional relationships between competing
lawmaking authorities both within branches of government and
between competing sovereigns. Environmental law expresses cer-
tain values and priorities that raise conflicts with other values
and priorities, including some of a constitutional dimension. Wheth-
er by happenstance or design, much of the Supreme Court's cur-
rent agenda seems disproportionately ready to unsettle those in-
stitutional relationships and the hierarchy of values upon which
modern environmental law has depended since 1970.
In my Garrison Lecture three years ago, I surveyed the envi-
ronmental law decisions of the Supreme Court between 1970 and
1999. I commented on which Justices had been more or less influ-
ential in shaping the Court's decisions and, even more provoca-
tively (if not foolishly), sought to "score" the individual Justices on
their responsiveness to environmental protection concerns based
on their votes cast in a subset of those cases. 3 The broader thesis
2. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court 1998 Term Foreword: The New
Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARv. L.
REV. 29 (1999); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We the
Court, 115 HnAv. L. REV. 4 (2001); Linda Greenhouse, The High Court's Target: Con-
gress, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 25, 2001 § 4 at 3.
3. Richard J. Lazarus, Thirty Years of Environmental Protection Law in the Su-
preme Court, 17 PACE ENvTL. L. REV. 1 (1999). The Garrison lecture was my initial
analysis and publication. I subsequently published a fuller description of the results
of my survey of the Justices in Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental
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of the lecture, however, was that there is something distinctively
"environmental" about environmental law and that the Court's in-
creasing inability to appreciate that dimension was leading to
more poorly-reasoned decisions and results.
Pace has now provided me with the luxury to revisit my ear-
lier conclusions with the benefit of three additional years of hind-
sight. To that end, this update addresses three topics. First, it
considers whether the opinion assignments and votes of individ-
ual Justices during the past three years either reinforce or under-
mine my prior assessment. Second, the update surveys the most
significant environmental law decisions of the past three years
and considers their portent for the possible restoration of what is
"environmental" about environmental law in the Court. Third
and finally, the update identifies important legal issues now loom-
ing before the Court.4
I. Reexamining the Environmental Scorecard of the
Justices
The only completed Supreme Court Terms since my 1999 Gar-
rison Lecture are the October Terms 1999 and 2000. Although the
current Term is now more than halfway completed, there are not
yet any decided environmental law cases. As it happens, there are
almost no such cases on the docket this Term. The only exception
is Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Commission,5 the latest in a seemingly never-ending series of
regulatory takings challenges to environmental land use restric-
tions.6
During the last two Terms, however, the Court decided twelve
additional cases arising in an environmental law context, as
broadly described in my 1999 Lecture. As in the past, these cases
include classic public land law controversies, pollution control con-
flicts, original actions raising border and interstate water alloca-
About Environmental Law, 47 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 703 (2000). A fuller description of the
numerical analysis underlying my Garrison lecture is set forth in that separate
publication.
4. 528 U.S. 167 (1999).
5. No. 00-1167 (U.S. argued Jan. 7, 2002). The court has decided this case since
this article first went to press. See note 77, infra.
6. E.g., Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (U.S. 1997);
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003 (1991); Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987);
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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tion disputes. They also include many cases that raise legal issues
for which the environmental setting would seem wholly incidental
to the resolution of the precise legal issue before the Court. 7
The leading opinion writer for the Court in the past survey
was Justice White by a large margin. During the past three years,
the opinion writing is far more evenly divided. Justices Scalia and
Ginsburg lead the pack, each writing three out of the twelve cases,
with Justices Kennedy and Souter responsible for two opinions
each. The small number of cases plainly limits the significance of
any of these numbers.8
Justice Kennedy continued his remarkable feat of almost
never dissenting in an environmental law case before the Court.
In my earlier survey, Justice Kennedy was, aside from one inter-
state water allocation dispute and a few qualified concurring opin-
ions, in the majority in virtually all fifty-seven of the
environmental cases in which he had participated. For the twelve
new cases, Kennedy kept his record fairly intact. He dissented
only once, in Idaho v. United States,9 which raised a dispute be-
tween the federal and state governments regarding ownership of
certain submerged lands. Still, as before, no single Justice dis-
sents from the majority very often in the environmental cases.
The lowest percentage for a Justice being in the majority was still
well above seventy percent.10
The final category, the "environmental protection" (EP) scores
of the Justices, is also intriguing. In the last survey, I described
several prominent examples in which individual Justices voted
quite differently than one might expect. So-called "liberal" Jus-
tices voted for positions denounced by environmentalists, and Jus-
tices whom environmentalists presume are hostile to their legal
positions in fact voted in their favor. I also explained some of the
reasons for that phenomena and why its occurrence is not at all
paradoxical, but rather to be expected. Indeed, that is why it was
so striking that Justice Douglas maintained an EP score of 100 in
favor of environmental protection. No matter what the legal is-
sue, no matter what the context, the Justice always managed to
cast a vote in favor of the position supported by environmentalists.
For that same reason, it is interesting that each of the Jus-
tices popularly aligned with the liberal side of the Court consist-
7. A full listing of the cases is included in Appendix A, infra.
8. See Appendix A, infra.
9. 533 U.S. 262 (2000).
10. See Appendix A, infra.
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ently voted in favor of the position supported by environmentalists
during the past several years. As in 1999, for the purposes of this
inquiry, I have identified a subset of cases for which the environ-
mental context was more than wholly incidental to the issue
before the Court. I have included six cases: Friends of the Earth
v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc., (Clean Water Act envi-
ronmental citizen suit standing),1 Public Lands Council v. Bab-
bitt (Department of the Interior Taylor Grazing Act regulations),12
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers (Clean Water Act jurisdiction over "isolated" wa-
ters),13 Whitman v. American Trucking Association (nondelega-
tion doctrine challenge to Clean Air Act),' 4 American Trucking
Association v. Whitman (relevance of costs in promulgation of na-
tional ambient air quality standards under the Clean Air Act), 15
and Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (regulatory takings challenge to
state wetlands protection law). 16 Justices Stevens, Souter, Gins-
burg, and Breyer cast all of their votes in these six cases in sup-
port of the environmentalist position.
By contrast, the conservative members of the Court were not
nearly so one-sided. Justices Thomas and Scalia voted in favor of
the environmentalist-favored position in three out of the six cases;
and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy
did so in four out of the six cases. The lowest EP score for any
Justice, accordingly, was a fifty, which was far higher than their
previous scores, albeit based on an even smaller sample than
before. 17
Justice Scalia, moreover, authored the Court's opinion in the
two cases that handed environmentalists and federal regulators
their single biggest win in the Supreme Court in decades. The
Court granted review in the two American Trucking Clean Air Act
cases separately, had separate briefings in the two cases, and
scheduled them for back-to-back separate oral arguments. Justice
Scalia authored the single unanimous opinion for the Court dis-
posing of both cases. As further elaborated in the next part of this
update, there was nothing remotely grudging or limited in the
Court's opinion. Scalia's opinion for the Court constitutes a
11. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
12. 529 U.S. 728 (2000).
13. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
14. 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
15. Id.
16. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
17. See Appendix B, infra.
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sweeping and categorical rejection of the regulated community's
position on all the legal issues before the Court, or at least, per-
haps more fairly described, of the D.C. Circuit's strained effort to
revitalize the nondelegation doctrine.
II. The Court's Recent Rulings and Their Portent for
Environmental Law
What is clear at the outset is that the October 1999 and Octo-
ber 2000 Supreme Court Terms included several exceedingly im-
portant environmental rulings. What is less clear is their portent
for the future of environmental law. The four cases are Friends of
the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.,18 the compan-
ion cases Whitman v. American Trucking Association19 and Ameri-
can Trucking Association v. Whitman,20 and Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island.21
Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw was a significant victory for
the environmental community. Immediately prior to that ruling,
the discernable trajectory of the Court's standing decisions was to
make it increasingly difficult for environmentalists to maintain
citizen suit enforcement actions. As described in my 1999 Lec-
ture, the Court's opinions in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federa-
tion22 and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 23 in particular, promoted
a view of standing requirements that systematically disadvan-
taged citizen suits. The inherent temporal and spatial uncertain-
ties associated with ecological cause and effect coupled with the
fragmentation of decision-making authority that exists both
within government and the regulated community in environmen-
tal law seemed poised to render the Court's heightened standing
requirements of injury, causation, and redressability virtually
insurmountable.
Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the Court in Laidlaw, by
contrast, responds to those very same concerns and reaffirms the
ability of environmental plaintiffs to demonstrate standing not-
withstanding the inevitable uncertainties in their allegations of
fact in support of standing. The Court agreed that the plaintiffs in
an environmental citizen suit need not allege and prove that the
18. 528 U.S. 167.
19. 531 U.S. 457.
20. Id.
21. 533 U.S. 606.
22. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
23. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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pollution will in fact harm the environment in a particular way.
The plaintiffs need only show injury to themselves, which can be
satisfied "when they aver that they use the affected area and are
persons 'for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the
area will be lessened."' 24 The Court further agreed that standing
is not defeated by the fact that any civil penalties obtained are
payable to the United States Treasury and not to the citizen plain-
tiffs themselves. The Court reasoned that civil penalties provide
"redress to citizen plaintiffs ... [t] o the extent that they encourage
defendants to discontinue current violations and deter them from
committing future ones."25
The two American Trucking Clean Air Act rulings likewise
constituted major victories for environmentalists and environ-
mental regulators. Together, they rebuffed legal arguments that
challenged two of modern environmental law's most basic precepts.
The nondelegation case, brought to the Court by the Solicitor Gen-
eral, questioned the very ability of the national government to
construct an institutional framework for environmental lawmak-
ing. Here too, as with the law of standing, the nature of the prob-
lem environmental law seeks to address generates certain hurdles
for the lawmaking process. Of relevance to the nondelegation doc-
trine, the development of environmental standards necessarily de-
pends on broad delegations of lawmaking authority to regulatory
agencies. It also requires the agency to promulgate standards
that are simultaneously enormously controversial, because of
their distributional implications, and riddled with scientific uncer-
tainty and technical complexity that undermine their trans-
parency. In short, federal environmental law depends on the very
kind of lawmaking framework that cannot be squared with the
strict view of the nondelegation doctrine promoted by the D.C. Cir-
cuit and the regulated community in American Trucking.26
For that same reason, the Court's sweeping rejection of the
D.C. Circuit's effort to resurrect a reinvigorated nondelegation
doctrine was essential to the maintenance of modern environmen-
tal law. The Court's ruling on the nondelegation issue was, more-
over, unanimous. Even the Chief Justice, whose earlier opinion in
24. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735
(1972)).
25. Id. at 203.
26. American Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. E.P.A., 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) opin-
ion modified on rehearing by 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
7
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
the Benzene case had indicated support for closer nondelegation
doctrine scrutiny,27 joined the Court's ruling, without elaboration.
The Court also unanimously maintained the status quo in the
companion case of American Trucking Association v. Whitman,
upholding EPA's longstanding position that the Clean Air Act
does not allow the Agency to consider compliance costs in estab-
lishing national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) under
the Act.28 Here too writing for the Court, Justice Scalia did far
more than just decline to embrace industry's proffered canon of
statutory construction under which agencies could presumptively
consider compliance costs in environmental standard setting un-
less Congress expressly and specifically provided otherwise. 29 The
Court effectively endorsed the converse position at least for the
purposes of promulgating NAAQS under the Clean Air Act. The
Court reasoned that the factor of compliance costs "is both so indi-
rectly related to public health and so full of potential for canceling
the conclusions drawn from direct health effects that it would
surely have been expressly mentioned in Sections 108 and 109
had Congress meant it to be considered."30 For that same reason,
Justice Breyer's strained effort in his separate concurrence to re-
habilitate costs as part of the public health inquiry ultimately
falls flat.31
Notwithstanding the Court's rulings in Laidlaw and the two
American Trucking cases, the warnings about the Supreme Court
that Professor Oliver Houck delivered in his own Garrison Lecture
about environmental law's future remain apt today.3 2 No doubt
the Court's most foreboding ruling was its decision in Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engi-
neers33 (SWANCC) in 2001. By a five to four vote, the Court not
only struck down the so-called "Migratory Bird Rule,"34 but went
on to hold that the Clean Water Act's definition of "navigable
waters" 35 does not extend to "nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate
27. Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 448 U.S. 607,
671 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
28. 531 U.S. at 469.
29. Brief Amicus Curiae of the General Electric Co. in Support of Cross-Peti-
tioner, at 7, American Trucking Ass'n v. Whitman, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (No. 99-1257).
30. American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 469 (emphasis in original).
31. Id. at 491 (Breyer, J., concurring).
32. Oliver Houck, Second Annual Lloyd K Garrison Lecture on Environmental
Law: Environmental Law and the General Welfare, 16 PACE ENVTL. L REV. 1 (1998).
33. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
34. Id. at 170.
35. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2002).
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waters."36 Because, moreover, "navigable waters" is the jurisdic-
tional touchstone for the entire Act, not just for the Section 404
program, the Court's ruling is equally applicable to the Section
402 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit
program.37
The significance of the Court's ruling is also not confined to
the meaning of the Clean Water Act. The majority explained that
it would have declined to defer to the Army Corps' statutory inter-
pretation even in the absence of "plain meaning" because of the
'serious constitutional problems' that would have been raised by
the broader construction of the Act's jurisdictional scope.38 Ac-
cording to the Chief Justice's opinion for the Court, there are "sig-
nificant constitutional and federalism issues" concerning whether
Congress has the authority under the Commerce Clause 39 to regu-
late dredge and fill activities in such isolated waters. 40 "Permit-
ting respondents to claim federal jurisdiction over ponds and
mudflats falling within the 'Migratory Bird Rule' 41 would result in
a significant impingement of the States' traditional and primary
power over land and water use."42
What is most striking about the result in SWANCC is that
until relatively recently, one could have safely assumed that the
federal government would have easily prevailed on both of the
questions presented. In United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc. ,43 to be sure, the Court expressly declined to address
the precise issue of statutory construction before the Court in
SWANCC. 44 The essential rationale of Riverside Bayview, how-
ever, especially as it relates to longstanding administrative con-
struction, legislative ratification, and statutory objectives, is the
same for both cases. The Court in Riverside Bayview had already
overcome the most difficult hurdle in construing "navigable wa-
ters," which was to uphold the notion that it extends to waters
that are themselves not navigable and are instead a seasonally
varying mixture of land and water.45
36. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 171-72.
37. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2002).
38. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173.
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
40. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174.
41. 51 Fed. Reg. 41, 217 (Nov. 13, 1986).
42. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174.
43. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
44. Id. at 131-32 n.8.
45. Id. at 138.
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Even more remarkable, however, was the Court's characteri-
zation of the Commerce Clause issue as problematic. To be sure,
the "Migratory Bird Rule's" focus on whether certain birds crossed
interstate borders does not even remotely reflect the relevant fac-
tors for determining Commerce Clause jurisdiction. It certainly
did not after United States v. Lopez,4 6 but also likely did not even
do so before Lopez. The infirmities of the "Migratory Bird Rule,"
however, simply reflect the fact that the Rule asks the wrong
question. It does not mean that if one asks the right question,
Commerce Clause jurisdiction does not exist for the very kind of
federal regulation at issue in SWANCC. Quite the opposite is
true. Properly framed, federal regulation of either dredge and fill
activities or discharges of pollutants into waters of the United
States, no matter how broadly defined, is well within Congres-
sional Commerce Clause authority both before and after Lopez.
The essentially economic nature of both the regulated activi-
ties themselves as well as their impacts fit well within a classic
notion of regulation of activities that "substantially affect" inter-
state commerce. The precise environmental media-air, land,
water-is not determinative of the economic character or substan-
tiality of either the activity or the impact. In SWANCC, for exam-
ple, the activity involved the construction of a large landfill
facility, which is itself a commercial undertaking as are the nu-
merous waste collection activities intimately associated with the
landfill.47 In addition, in SWANCC, the proposed landfill, by de-
stroying habitat upon which substantial populations of migratory
birds depended, would directly affect the multi-million dollar tour-
ism and recreational industry that depends on maintenance and
protection of such bird populations. 48
The Court's constitutional problem with the Clean Water Act
is not, at bottom, based on the notion that Congress could not in
fact regulate the very activities at issue in SWANCC. It is instead
based on the very different problem that the "Migratory Bird
Rule," and perhaps even the Act's current statutory structure and
jurisdictional touchstone fail to reflect the Court's newly con-
structed framework for Commerce Clause analysis post Lopez,49
46. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
47. Respondents' Brief at 43-47, Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (No.
99-1178).
48. Id. at 47-49.
49. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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and United States v. Morrison.50 Instead, the Clean Water Act,
like most of the other comprehensive federal environmental laws
that Congress first enacted in the 1970s, pays little attention to
Commerce Clause concerns in the first instance. These laws are,
as Professor Oliver Houck described in his own Garrison Lecture,
sub silentio premised on expansive notions of Congressional power
under the General Welfare Clause.51
Environmental laws inevitably regulate and affect commerce
because the nation's natural resources literally supply, after all,
the basic ingredients of commercial life. But that is not to say that
the objectives of those laws are commercial or that their commer-
cial character is the reason the laws regulate certain activities.
What frequently makes environmental laws so historically unique
and important is that they promote a different vision of the rela-
tionship between humankind and the natural environment, which
is deliberately not commercial in its emphasis.
Hence, even assuming that Congress could theoretically re-
write all of the current federal environmental laws in a manner
wholly compatible with the Court's current Commerce Clause
analysis, without any jurisdictional loss, the fact remains that
there is an analytical gap between the Court's precedent and the
existing statutes. It would, moreover, be no easy task simply to
reenact existing laws in a manner more harmonious with the new
judicial precedent. It is far more difficult under our system of law-
making to enact statutes than it is to prevent their enactment.
And, that would be especially so in the environmental arena, now
that the substantiality of the cost implications of various statutory
schemes are better understood then they were at the time of their
original enactment. In the aftermath of SWANCC, for example,
the legislative hurdles are high and wide to now amend the Clean
Water Act to recapture the more expansive meaning of "navigable
waters" and "waters of the United States" rejected by the Court in
SWANCC.
Until SWANCC, the threat posed to existing federal environ-
mental laws was only theoretical. The origins of the Court's revi-
siting of its Commerce Clause analysis were primarily derived
from the Court's understandable concern with Congress's never-
ceasing proclivity to expand the federal criminal jurisdiction of the
50. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
51. Houck, supra note 32, at 13; U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1.
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federal judiciary. 52 Neither of the laws struck down in Lopez or
Morrison involved matters that readily lent themselves to state
regulation in the absence of an overarching federal framework.
Environmental protection requirements, by contrast, have been
highly dependent on the existence of just such a comprehensive
federal administrative framework even when that framework ulti-
mately seeks state and local implementation efforts.
Finally, the Court has decided yet another significant regula-
tory takings claim, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,53 since I presented
my Garrison Lecture. The Palazzolo results were far more mixed
for both property rights advocates and governmental regulators.
For each, there were parts of the opinion to be applauded, yet also
other parts that should raise substantial concerns.
At issue in Palazzolo were two different kinds of per se tak-
ings tests, one favored by developers and the other by government
regulators. The first concerns the relevance to the regulatory tak-
ings inquiry when a landowner acquires the property after the re-
striction being challenged is in place. In Palazzolo,54 the Rhode
Island Supreme Court held that such pre-acquisition notice is an
absolute defense to a takings claim whether brought under Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council55 or Penn Central Transporta-
tion Co. v. City of NewYork. 56 This so-called "notice rule" amounts
to a per se "no takings" test.
The second concerns the degree of deprivation required to
trigger a finding that a land use restriction is a per se taking
under Lucas. In Lucas, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a Lucas
per se taking required a threshold finding that the landowner had
been deprived of all economic value or use.57 Palazzolo argued
before the Supreme Court in favor of an expansion of Lucas in
which a landowner's loss would be measured by the amount of use
or value allegedly lost by the restriction rather than by the
amount of use or value remaining. 58 Palazzolo further argued for
an expansion of Lucas under which a court would consider only
52. See Sara Sun Beale, The Unintended Consequences of Enhancing Gun Penal-
ties: Shooting Down the Commerce Clause and Arming Federal Prosecutors, 51 DuKE
L.J. 1641 (2002).
53. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
54. 746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000).
55. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
56. 438 U.S. 104 (1978)
57. 505 U.S. at 1015.
58. 533 U.S. at 623.
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the restricted portion of the land in deciding whether a depriva-
tion of all economic value or use had occurred.
The Court rejected both the per se no takings test at least as
applied in Palazzolo, and Mr. Palazzolo's request that it expand
the potential applicability of the Lucas per se takings test.59 With
respect to the former, the Court reasoned that "[tihe State may
not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean Bundle." 60
"It would be illogical, and unfair, to bar a regulatory takings claim
because of the post-enactment transfer of ownership where the
steps necessary to make the claim were not taken, or could not
have been taken, by a previous owner."61
In likewise rejecting the landowner's competing per se test,
the Court substantially limited the Lucas per se rule by reaffirm-
ing the extreme nature of the regulatory impact needed for its ap-
plication. The Court held that "permitting a landowner to build a
substantial residence on an 18-acre parcel does not leave the prop-
erty 'economically idle."' 62 The Court rejected Palazzolo's claim
that a Lucas per se taking may be triggered by a substantial re-
duction in value alone, regardless of the amount of remaining
value in the property.63
Palazzolo suggests the demise of per se takings analysis in
favor of the kind of balancing approached favored by Justice
O'Connor and seemingly favored by Justice Kennedy. Ever since
Justice White departed from the Court in 1993, it has been clear
that Justice Scalia's then-recent opinion for the Court in Lucas
had lost its majority, meaning that the Court was likely to apply
Lucas only narrowly in future cases. Justice White supplied the
fifth vote in Lucas and Justice Kennedy, remarkably, joined only
the Court's judgment and wrote separately.
As described in my original Garrison Lecture, Kennedy's con-
curring opinion in Lucas embraced a legal analysis that is very
different than that advanced by the majority. He made plain his
view that total economic deprivation is not enough, standing
alone, to justify a per se approach. It is also relevant "whether the
deprivation is contrary to reasonable, investment-backed expecta-
tions."64 Kennedy also rejected suggestions that the kinds of
59. Id. at 631.
60. Id. at 627.
61. Id. at 628
62. Id. at 631.
63. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 616.
64. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034.
13
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
"background" legal principles that could justify a complete eco-
nomic deprivation must reflect some static common law. In Ken-
nedy's "view, reasonable expectations must be understood in light
of the whole of our legal tradition. The common law of nuisance is
too narrow a confine for the exercise of regulatory power in a com-
plex and interdependent society."6 5
In Palazzolo, Justice Kennedy's writing for the Court finally
realized that expectation by narrowly construing Lucas in several
significant respects. His opinion for the Court narrowly construed
the economic deprivation trigger necessary for a Lucas per se tak-
ing. His opinion purported not to reach the content of the "back-
ground principles" that provide an exception to a Lucas per se
taking, but nonetheless described those principles in terms that
make clear that they are not strictly confined to centuries-old com-
mon law doctrine. In particular, Justice Kennedy's opinion for the
Court repeatedly presumes that legislation or regulation may be a
background principle, suggesting that the only question is not
whether they may be, but the "precise circumstances" of "when"
they are. 66 Perhaps even more significantly, Justice Kennedy's
opinion for the Court supports the contention that background
principles not only can change over time, but can do so retroac-
tively. Once, therefore, a land use regulation is deemed to reflect
"common, shared understandings of permissible limitations de-
rived from a State's legal tradition," background principles will
apply to all landowners regardless of when they may have ac-
quired their property: "A regulation or common law rule cannot
be a background principle for some owners, but not for others."6 7
The import of Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court, espe-
cially when combined with the concurring opinion of Justice
O'Connor and the four dissenting Justices is that the Court is
likely to fall back more on the kind of multi-factored balancing
tests of reasonableness in its taking analysis, akin to that Justice
Brennan set forth in his opinion for the Court in Penn Central,
and away from the Lucas per se approach. Justice Kennedy's
opinion for the Palazzolo Court repeatedly emphasizes the essen-
tial touchstone of "reasonableness" just as he did in his separate
concurring opinion in Lucas. And, Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion makes even more explicit her view of the continuing via-
65. Id. at 1035.
66. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629.
67. Id. at 630.
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bility of the Penn Central takings analysis and its balancing
approach.68
III. The Court's Future Docket
There is currently only one significant environmental case
pending before the Court. The day after the Court decided Palaz-
zolo, the Court showed that its appetite for regulatory takings
claim remained whetted by granting review in yet another case.69
There are also several major constitutional controversies that
seemed destined for the Court's review in the near term. Indeed,
to a certain extent, that Court has essentially invited the lower
courts to explore the issues, with the apparent purpose of estab-
lishing a lower court record for the Court's review in a future
proceeding.
In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Plan-
ning Agency, 70 landowners appear to have reached the limits of
the Court's willingness to protect private property rights. The up-
shot may well be the first unconditional victory for government
regulators in an environmental takings case since Keystone Bitu-
minous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis in 1987. 71 The landown-
ers argue in Tahoe-Sierra that a temporary moratorium on land
use development constitutes a per se taking under Lucas because
the landowner is deprived of all "use" of the property during
the time in which the moratorium is effective. This per se rule
applies, they argue, regardless of the moratorium's duration, geo-
graphic scope, economic impact, or its interference with reasona-
ble investment-backed expectations. 72  In the aftermath of
Palazzolo, however, little doubt remains that a majority of the
Justices are now ready to reject such an extreme per se approach
to regulatory takings analysis.
For that same reason, however, government regulators and
environmentalists have reason for concern that Justices Kennedy
and O'Connor may, as part of their shift towards balancing tests
and less absolutist positions, be ready to revisit the "parcel as a
whole" touchstone that has proved so important to those defend-
ing government regulations challenged as a regulatory taking. In
68. Id. at 632.
69. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 533
U.S. 948 (2001).
70. 216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000).
71. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
72. Petitioner's Brief at 45, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council (No. 00-1167).
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Penn Central, the Court ruled that a takings inquiry considered
the "parcel as a whole" and not just that smaller portion of the
property most restricted in deciding whether a land use regulation
amounts to a taking requiring the payment of just compensa-
tion.73 Because most land use restrictions do not restrict an entire
parcel, the practical effect of the "parcel as a whole" analysis can
be to make it far more difficult for landowners to prevail.
Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Palazzolo suggests
that there are several Justices who are interested in revisiting the
"parcel as a whole" test and who are questioning its propriety.
The Court's opinion formally declined "to examine the persisting
question of what is the proper denominator in the takings frac-
tion," but only because Mr. Palazzolo did not properly present the
issue in the courts below or in his petition for a writ of certiorari. 74
But the Court expressly noted that "at times" the Court "has ex-
pressed discomfort with the logic of the rule," citing University of
Chicago law professor Richard Epstein, 75 who promotes an ag-
gressive application of the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation
Clause to governmental regulation. 76
The Court's invitation is clear. A majority of the Court may
be ready to revisit the Penn Central holding and is inviting liti-
gants to raise and brief the issue in future cases. It seems likely,
moreover, that at least the two "swing" Justices, Kennedy and
O'Connor, will ultimately favor a more nuanced, contextual ap-
proach to defining the property that rejects automatically defining
the relevant property either in its broadest or narrowest possible
terms.77
Another major constitutional issue likely to be on the Court's
docket in the near future is whether the Endangered Species Act
(ESA) Section 9's application to habitat modification falls within
Congress's Commerce Clause authority.78 In SWANCC, the Court
could avoid the constitutional issue by interpreting the "plain
73. 438 U.S. at 130-31.
74. 533 U.S. at 631 (emphasis added).
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. RICHARD ALLEN EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN (1985).
77. The Court decided the Tahoe-Sierra case since this essay went to press in
March. See 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002). By a six to three vote, Justice Stevens' opinion for
the Court did, as predicted, narrow the applicability of Lucas and expand the applica-
bility of Penn Central. The Court's reasoning, however, also reaffirmed the "parcel as
a whole" approach. The result was a major win for environmental regulators.
78. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2002).
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meaning" of "navigable waters." In an ESA Section 9 case, how-
ever, the Court will not be able to similarly avoid the constitu-
tional issue because the Court has already upheld the Department
of the Interior's regulatory construction of the statutory term
"take" to extend to modification of habitat that actually harms the
species. 79 To date, two courts of appeals (the D.C. Circuit and the
Fourth Circuit) have upheld the constitutionality of the statute,
but both times over loud dissents.80 In the absence of a circuit
conflict, the Supreme Court denied certiorari on each of those
prior occasions.
Although it seems, therefore, unlikely that the Court would
agree to hear the issue in the absence of a circuit conflict, there is
reason to believe that such a conflict may soon be presented by one
of a host of cases pending in the lower courts. The case with the
most immediate potential to provide a candidate for Court review,
Shields v. Norton, is now pending before a reportedly skeptical
Fifth Circuit. If that appellate court rules against the federal gov-
ernment on Commerce Clause grounds, the Supreme Court will
have little choice but to grant a Solicitor General's request for fur-
ther review. 8 '
Whenever it is finally presented to the Court, the question
whether ESA Section 9 passes constitutional muster will chal-
lenge the Court's commitment to the analytical framework that it
has adopted and pursued in its recent precedent. The ESA's
structure and jurisdictional touchstones do not neatly fit that new
framework, which focuses in the first instance on whether the ac-
tivities being regulated are sufficiently "economic" in character.8 2
The dilemma for the Court is that, notwithstanding the awkward-
ness of that misfit, the ESA is the very kind of legislation that is
necessarily national in its purpose and reach.8 3
79. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S.
687 (1995).
80. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 506 (Sentelle, J., dissenting); National Ass'n of
Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1060 (1997) (Luttig, J., dissenting).
81. This case was on appeal at the time this essay went to press, but has since
been decided. See Shields v. Norton, 289 F.3d 832 (5th Cir. 2002). The Court did not
reach the merits because it dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
82. See Lopez, 514 U.S. 549; Morrison, 529 U.S. 598.
83. The same could not be readily said of the federal laws at issue in either Lopez
or Morrison. And, although many believe that it was true of the federal dredge and
fill permitting program contested in SWANCC, the procedural posture of that case
masked the federal character of the program before the Justices. Because the State of
Illinois, unlike most states, has a comprehensive permitting program that applied to
the proposed dredging and filling activity at issue in SWANCC, the Court may well
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Whether the Court is willing to recognize the constitutional
propriety of allowing Congress to address these kinds of environ-
mental and natural resource issues may well turn on its apprecia-
tion of what is "environmental" about environmental law. It
should be sufficient to sustain national legislation that protection
and maintenance of the nation's natural resource base is funda-
mental to any viable economy. No greater commercial motive or
nexus should be necessary. As explained by another Garrison
Lecturer, Professor Joseph Sax, albeit in another context, it will
require the Justices to appreciate the "economy of nature" as well
as respond to the current "market economy."8 4
There is reason for defenders of the ESA to be hopeful in this
regard. Justice O'Connor joined Justice Blackmun's dissent in
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, which faulted Justice Scalia's opin-
ion for the Court for engaging in a "slash and burn expedition"
through the environmental law of standing.85 And, Justice Ken-
nedy declined to join part of the majority rationale and wrote sep-
arately about the need for broader Congressional authority than
contemplated by the majority opinion.8 6 Even more importantly,
perhaps, was the Fourth Circuit opinion upholding the ESA's con-
stitutionality in Gibbs v. Babbitt, 7 which was authored by Chief
Judge Wilkinson. Chief Judge Wilkinson is a highly-regarded
moderate conservative jurist and is more likely to foreshadow the
views of O'Connor and Kennedy than Judge Luttig who dissented
in that case.88
Finally, Justice Kennedy's overlooked concurring opinion in
Laidlaw strongly suggests a potential third round of constitu-
tional litigation on the Court's docket in the near future. While
joining Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the Court in Laidlaw, Ken-
nedy separately wrote that '[d]ifficult and fundamental questions
are raised when we ask whether exactions of public fines by pri-
vate litigants, and the delegation of Executive power which might
be inferable from the authorization, are permissible in view of the
responsibilities committed to the Executive by Article II of the
have been left with the impression that the federal Section 404 permit requirements
were merely duplicative of the state program.
84. Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433 (1993).
85. 504 U.S. at 606 (Blackmun, J. dissenting with O'Connor, J., joining).
86. Id. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
87. 214 F.3d 483.
88. Id. at 506 (dissenting opinion).
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Constitution of the United States."8 9 Justice Kennedy, in short,
questioned the constitutionality of environmental citizen suit en-
forcement under Article II as currently provided for in most every
federal environmental law.
There are three potentially pertinent clauses in Article II.
These include the Appointments Clause (§ 2, cl. 2), Vesting Clause
(§ 1, cl. 1), and the Take Care Clause (§ 3, cl. 4). The Appoint-
ments Clause provides exclusive authority in the President to ap-
point officers of the United States, subject to Senate confirma-
tion. 90 The Vesting Clause provides that "the Executive Power
shall be vested in the President;" 91 and the Take Care Clause pro-
vides simply that the President shall "take care that the Laws be
faithfully executed."92
The gist of Kennedy's suggestion is that allowing environmen-
tal suits for civil penalties payable to the federal Treasury
amounts to an impermissible Congressional delegation of Execu-
tive branch authority to private citizens in violation of Article II.
Kennedy's statement has breathed life into the issue in the lower
courts because the regulated community is well aware of the piv-
otal role the Justice plays in the Court's decision-making in envi-
ronmental cases. The issue is currently pending in two federal
courts of appeals and one federal district court in North Carolina.
The Fifth Circuit case is Shields v. Norton,93 the same case previ-
ously described as raising the question of whether Congress has
exceeded its Commerce Clause authority in section 9 of the En-
dangered Species Act. In the cases pending before the Eighth Cir-
cuit and in North Carolina, Mississippi River Revival v. City of St.
Paul94 and North Carolina Shellfish Growers Association v. North
Carolina Coastal Federation,95 defendants have each raised the
constitutional defense in resisting a Clean Water Act citizen suit.
Here too it is no coincidence that this latest constitutional is-
sue arises in an environmental case. The nature of the ecological
problem to be addressed is what prompted Congress to include cit-
izen suit provisions. The vast number of activities subject to envi-
89. 528 U.S. at 197 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
90. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
91. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
92. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4.
93. No. 00-50839, on appeal, (5th Cir. 2002). As described in note 81, supra, the
Fifth Circuit has since dismissed this case for lack of jurisdiction without reaching
this issue. See 289 F.3d 832.
94. No. 01-2511, on appeal, (8th Cir.).
95. No. 7:01-CV-36-BO(1) (E.D.N.C.)
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ronmental protection requirements makes it impossible for the
government to rely solely on its own limited enforcement re-
sources. In addition, the schizophrenic nature of government's
role in environmental protection-as both regulator and the regu-
lated-renders it all the more important to have a citizen over-
seer. Having the penalties payable to the Treasury is a sensible
safeguard to ensure against the unjust enrichment of private citi-
zens to the detriment of the public fisc. Ironically, however, it
may well be that same safeguard that is the nub of Justice Ken-
nedy's suggestion of a possible constitutional infirmity.
Conclusion
Environmental law will continue, as it has in the past, to
raise difficult questions of federal constitutional law. Some of
these will be rooted in the peculiar way in which the concerns ad-
dressed by environmental law challenge our nation's lawmaking
institutions and processes. Others are even more fundamental in
nature because they relate to possible differences in priorities and
substantive values between environmental law and those re-
flected in certain constitutional guarantees. The Court's ability to
address both kinds of issues will ultimately turn on the extent to
which the Justices appreciate the "environmental" dimension to
the legal issue they face.
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APPENDIX B
Environmental Cases Decided by the
United States Supreme Court
October Term 1999-October Term 2000
By Justice-Environmental Protection Scores
EP Ratio EP Score
Justice (# EP votes/EP cases) (EP Ratio x 100)
Breyer 6/6 100
Ginsburg 6/6 100
Kennedy 4/6 66.7
O'Connor 4/6 66.7
Rehnquist 4/6 66.7
Scalia 3/6 50
Souter 6/6 100
Stevens 6/6 100
Thomas 3/6 50
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